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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the changes in the wage share in manufacturing
industry in Mexico, Turkey, and Korea in the era of globalization. The focus is on the
one hand over the effects of globalization on the wage share , which are measured by
the effects of international trade and FDI intensity of the economy. On the other hand,
the process of opening up has been accompanied by major currency crises in most
developing countries in the last decade, which has affected the wage share through
exchange rate depreciation and economic recession.

The paper develops a Post-

Keynesian conflicting claims model for an open economy under the pressure of
globalization, and an equation for the wage share is estimated for each country using
Seemingly Unrelated Regression method. The results show that both recessions and
nominal depreciations have a clear and lasting negative effect on the manufacturing
wage share in all countries, whereas the effect of openness, in particular international
trade depends on industrial policy structure. Increased export intensity leads to a
decline the manufacturing wage share in Turkey and Mexico, but no significant effect
in Korea. The positive expectations from FDI are also not materialized in any of the
three countries.
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1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of globalization on the wage
share in three major developing countries, Mexico, Turkey, and Korea, which have
gone through a substantial process of liberalization at the national as well as
international level, although the starting point differs, ranging from early 1980s in the
case of Turkey and Mexico, to the late 1980s in the case of Korea. These countries
have an important share in world trade, and are representing a variety of development
paths in the emerging markets, and are usually referred by the IMF as the successful
examples of integration to the world economy. In spite of the differences in their
former development policies as well as liberalization process , they also shared the
common adversity of financial crises in the 1990s and 2000s, which followed the
liberalization of capital accounts. In addition to discussing the effects of globalization
on the wage share through the channels of international trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows, the paper will also address the effects of crisis on the process
of income distribution, since increased financial fragility and risk of currency crisis
have accompanied financial liberalization and globalization.

The issue of income distribution vs. globalization has attracted a wide variety of
research as well as the attention of institutions like the IMF, World Bank, ILO, and
UN. ILO has established the World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalization and published the report on “A fair globalization: Creating opportunities
for all” (2004). World Bank, after having promoted trade liberalization for two
decades, in its 2005 World Development Report discusses that the aggregate effects of
trade reform on income distribution are not always clear, and there are winners and
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losers (World Bank, 2005); however the policy framework is defined as previously,
focusing particularly on the areas of the labor market flexibility, infrastructure, and
competition. The concerns regarding the links between globalization and income
distribution have motivated three broad lines of research. The first focuses on
individual income distribution, and consists of two contrasting positions: on the one
hand are the researchers, who argue that the process of further economic liberalization
at national as well as international level will reverse the trends (e.g. Dollar and Kraay,
2004). On the other hand are the researchers, who, quite on the contrary, see
Washington Consensus-inspired policies as a reason for the increased inequality in the
last two decades (eg. Cornia, 2004). The second line of research focuses on wage
inequality and emphasizes the adverse effects of capital mobility as well as
technological change on unskilled labor in both developed and developing countries ,
in a way contrary to the expectations of the traditional trade theory (eg. Feenstra and
Hanson, 1997; Harrison and Hanson, 1999). The third line of research argues that not
only individual or wage inequality are increasing, but also labor as a whole is losing
ground to capital in both capital abundant developed and labor abundant developing
countries (Lee and Jayadev, 2005; Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Rodrik, 1998;
Haque, 2004; Griffin, 2003; Pollin, 2002; UNCTAD, 1997). It is this third group,
where this paper takes place.

The studies by Rodrik (1998), Diwan (2001), Harrison (2002), Lee and Jayadev
(2005), which are based on empirical tests of the effects of globalization on labor’s
share for a panel data of developed and developing countries, are of particular concern
to our study, and point at some regularities about the falling trend in labor ’s share
across countries. The secular fall of the labor’s share is especially marked for
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countries, which have experienced financial crises and large swings in the exchange
rate (Diwan, 2001; Harrison, 2002; Lee and Jayadev, 2005). The absence of capital
account restrictions is associated with a lower labor’s share (Rodrik, 1998; Diwan,
2001; Harrison, 2002; Lee and Jayadev, 2005). Foreign direct investment and
favorable conditions for capital inflow coinc ide with low wages (Harrison, 2002). The
positive effects of increased capital accumulation are wiped out by the negative
impact of reduced capital controls, depreciating exchange rates, and a dampening of
the bargaining power of labor. Regarding trade, Rodrik (1998) and Harrison (2002)
find a negative connection between the share of trade in GDP and labor’s share;
Diwan (2001) additionally argues that the negative impact is dominated by normal
years, whereas during a crisis there is a positive effect.

The political econom y approach emphasizes the asymmetry between the fall back
options of capital vs. labor due to the increase in the mobility of capital, the
consequent increase in the elasticity of labor demand, and the threat of capital to
relocate or outsource as the major factors, which pressurizes the bargaining power of
labor, and generate s a distributional bias in the outcomes of globalization as well as
the crises (Rodrik, 1998; Burke and Epstein, 2001; Crotty, et al. 1997; Harrison,
2002). While labor has to compete harder to attract capital, the increased international
competitive pressures are making capital less willing to accommodate wage demands ,
both leading to a race to the bottom.

In order to test the effects of the various channels through which globalization and
crisis may affect labor’s share, this paper uses a Post-Keynesian conflicting claims
model for an open economy, where distribution is determined via wage bargaining by

4

workers, price setting by firms, and improvements in productivity. A reduced form for
the wage share is obtained from the model and is estimated using the Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. There are two sets of variables that affect
income distribution: i) growth (or recession during a crisis) and currenc y shocks ,
which lead to inflation that is unexpected or non-reflected to wages , ii) the degree of
interaction with the global economy through international trade and FDI, which may
effect the bargaining power of labor, and lead to a downward shift of the distributional
curve.

One feature that distinguishes this study from previous empirical work on the effect of
globalization on distribution is that the time span of the previous work does not
include the Asian crises of 1997, and the 2001 cris is in Turkey. Understanding the
distributional impacts of the crisis is particularly important at this point in history,
when short-term financial flows have once again led to shocks to local currencies in
the emerging markets in the first half of 2006, and the stability of the economies are
being threatened with a global turbulence and contagion effects in the financial
markets.

A second feature of this paper is that it is based on country specific estimations, and
takes into account the heterogeneity in the effects of globalization and crisis across
countries. In addition to the focus on country specific factors, another reason for
working with Korea, Mexico, and Turkey as representative cases of the major
developing countries is data limitations regarding labor’s share. An uninterrupted time
series data for wages is unfortunately not available for many developing countries1.
Due to further data limitations, which are discussed in Section 2, our analysis is based

5

on manufacturing industry. Working with the manufacturing industry in Korea,
Mexico, and Turkey brings together the advantage of working with continuous and
long time series data instead of unbalanced and short panel data , which does not allow
for estimating country specific equations.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses data related issues
and Section 3 presents the stylized facts of the countries. Section 4 introduces a model
of distribution, and Section 5 presents the estimation methodology and the results.
Section 6 summarizes the conclusions.

2. Data Sources

The wage share data used in this study is the data on the manufacturing industry
wages/value added supplied due to the problems associated with the quality of the
nationwide wage data. The OECD National Accounts Database delivers estimations
for the nationwide labor compensation data for Turkey and Mexico for the period of
1970-1988, when no aggregate wage statistic was reported in those countries. So
rather than estimating a model based on estimated wage sha re, we conclude that the
wage share data for the manufacturing industry is more reliable, offering longer time
series based on firm level statistical surveys.

Also the changes in the aggregate wage share might be distorted by the structural
change in these countries related with a shift from agriculture to industry and services,
which might have reduced the number of self-employed, and increased the number of
wage earners. We cannot correct this possible distortion for the whole time period of
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1970-2003 due to the inexistence of data on self -employment as well as total
employment vs. number of employees for earlier periods not even at aggregate level,
let alone sectoral details.

Working with the manufacturing data on the other hand has the advantage of focusing
on the locomotive sector of growth in developing countries, which has also been the
engine of export booms. Compared to 1970 as of 2003 the share of manufacturing
exports in merchandise exports increased from 32.5% to 81.5% in Mexico, and from a
very low level of 8.9% to 84.5% in Turkey. The increase has been lower in Korea,
who already started with a 76.7% share of manufacturing exports in merchandise
exports in 1970, which nevertheless achieved an even high level of 92.7% in 2003.
Manufacturing industry has also attracted a good deal of FDI inflows – ranging
between 35.4% (in 1991) and 80.0% (in 1994) in Korea, 22.3% (2001) and 84.3%
(1982) in Mexico, 24.0% (2003) and 94.8% (2000) in Turkey. As of 2003 the share of
manufacturing value added in GDP is 26.4% in Korea, 18.0% in Mexico, and 20.0%
in Turkey. In all countries the increasing trend in manufacturing share in value added
was reversed in late 1980s. Currently manufacturing employment comprises 24.7% of
total employment in Korea, and 11.1% in Mexico and 19.4% in Turkey.

Nevertheless the wage data in manufacturing industry is also not free of data quality
problems, particularly regarding the international comparability of the data. There are
two major reasons for that. First problem is about the definitions and data sources. T he
data source for Korea and Mexico is the OECD Industrial Structural Analysis
Database (STAN) for the period of 1970-2003 for wages as well as employment and
value added, however there is no data in STAN for Turkey, although it is a member of
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the OECD, due to the lack of labor compensation data in Turkey based on a
comparable methodology. STAN reports labor compensation data for Korea and
Mexico2, which consists of wages and salaries of employees as well as supplements
such as contributions to social security, private pensions, health insurance, and similar
schemes by the employers. This is the point where the comparability problem arises
with Turkey, where the only source of wage data in Turkey that goes back to a date
earlier than 1987 is on the manufacturing industry wage and salaries , which do not
include the social security, pension contributions and the like payable by the
employer 3. This is one of the reasons why the wage share in value added for Turkey
will be lower than that for Mexico and Korea4.

Another important point that could account for the differences in the share of labor in
value added is the share of self-employed in total employment. In both national
account statistics and survey da ta all earnings of the self-employed are incorporated in
the operating surplus of the firm, in spite of the fact that part of these earnings is labor
income rather than profit income, and there are several methods for estimating the
share of self-employment earnings that could be associated with labor income 5
(Gollin, 2002). In a country with a high share of waged or salaried employees in total
employment, the measurement problem that could result from classifying selfemployment earnings due to labor income as operating s urplus will be low, and the
labor share in value added will tend to be higher compared to countries with a lower
share of employees in total employment. This partly explains the higher labor share in
Korea, as will be seen in the figures in Section 3, where the share of employees in
manufacturing industry is the highest among the three countries 6.
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Following on these two problems about the international comparability of the labor
share data, the discussion in Section 3 below will be based on the trends (%changes)
through time within a country rather than cross country comparisons. In the following
we will refer to labor’s share in manufacturing industry for all countries simply as
wage share.

Consistent with the choice of the manufacturing wage share as the indicator of
distribution, we will use the value added in manufacturing, as well as the share of
exports and imports in manufacturing value added. The data is supplied by the World
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).

In the case of FDI, the consistent approach is also to use the manufacturing FDI data;
however the data for manufacturing FDI supplied by the OECD starts in 1981 for
Mexico, 1985 for Korea, and 1992 for Turkey. For Turkey and Korea, the
manufacturing FDI/value added and aggregate FDI/ GDP (supplied by the WDI) are
highly correlated, but for Mexico this is not the case. Therefore for Mexico we will
use the manufacturing FDI, even if the time series is short. For Turkey and Korea the
time series for manufacturing FDI is however too short; therefore we will check for
robustness based on two specifications using both aggregate and manufacturing FDI,
but both of these results have to be evaluated with caution.

3. Stylized Facts

First we will briefly discuss and compare the process of integration to the world
economy in Mexico, Turkey, and Korea. Both Turkey and Mexico, reflecting the
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general Latin American case, experienced a major structural change in the 1980s by
shifting from an import substituting industrialization strategy to an export-oriented
growth model via implementing an orthodox structural adjustment program, as
typically prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank (see eg. for Mexico Blecker,
2006; Pacheco-Lopez and Thirlwall, 2004; Salas and Zepeda, 2003; for Turkey
Boratav and Yeldan 2002; Metin-Özcan et al, 2001; Onaran and Yentürk, 2002). Procapital redistribution of income was a major tool of the export oriented strategy in
both countries, where a drastic initial decline in the wage share moderated the
competitive pressures over capital. However, contrary to the promises, after two
decades of extensive liberalization the persistence of high unemployment goes hand in
hand with lower labor costs in Turkey (Aydiner and Onaran, 2004), and in Mexico
unemployment can be kept at a relatively lower level only due to the informal
economy and the massive emigration to the United States since the 1990s (Blecker,
2006).

Both Mexico and Turkey have also been integrated to advanced countries through free
trade agreements -the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the
United States for Mexico in 1994, and the Customs Union with the European Union in
1995 for Turkey. Mexico also had an intensive FDI-led integration with the regional
economy, however this process has relied heavily on cheap labor , imports of inputs,
and weak backward linkages to domestic supplier, and has done little to promote
sustainable industrial development through spillover effects, industrial restructuring,
job growth, and environmental improvements in Mexico overall (Gallagher and
Zarsky, 2004; Blecker, 2006). This is also a call for lessons for Turkey, whose ability
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to attract FDI has been recently remarkably increasing, due to the positive
expectations regarding the EU accession process.

Finally both Mexico and Turkey experienced the first financial crises in the 1990s
following the fragilities created by massive short-term capital inflows after the
liberalization of capital accounts, Turkey in 1994 and Mexico in 1994-1995. As
speculative and short-term capital inflows generated a fragile growth pattern, the
capital inflows and additionally the pegged exchange rate regime in Mexico led to the
appreciation of the local currency and high current account deficits in both countries,
which then triggered a speculative capital outflow. Turkey repeated the former
mistake of many other developing countries by adapting a currency peg in 2000, and
had an even more severe crisis in 2001. Mexico faced another recession in 2001,
followed by slow growth in the economy and further recession in manufacturing
during 2002-03.

As opposed to Turkey and Mexico, in Korea the process of structural change and
export-orientation was based neither on mere wage repression nor an unlimited
deregulation of product and financial markets (Amsden, 1989). The state aimed at not
only disciplin ing labor but also controlling capital, financial system, foreign trade
regime , exchange rates and capital flows as part of its export-oriented growth strategy
until late 1980s. As the country moved up the industrial ladder towards the production
of capital and skill-intensive goods with investment, export, and growth rates
significantly higher than the Latin American countries and Turkey, a sustained and
predictable increase in wages in a conflict-controlled environment, rather than low
wages has been important in maintaining high demand, high growth and high
accumulation (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2005). However when the external
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neoliberal forces, as well as the large domestic corporations pushed for deregulation,
Korea had stages of liberalization from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s (Crotty
and Lee, 2002) . Exactly through this process of liberalization, Korea became
increasingly more fragile , and finally after the crisis in Thailand in July 1997,
financial outflows also hit the economy of Korea, which was praised by all
international institutions even shortly before the Asian crisis, in a very similar way to
Mexico and Turkey.

In the following, we discuss the developments in growth and distribution in Korea,
Mexico, and Turkey. Table 1 reports the annual growth rate in GDP and
manufacturing value added for sub-periods. A very striking fact is that the annual
average growth rate of GDP is significantly lower and its variation (standard
deviation/mean) is higher in the post-1980s than the 1970s, irrespective of the
differences in the economic policies in all countries. The change is particularly
pronounced in the case of manufacturing industry in Korea, which is also partly due to
the very rapid rate of industrialization in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the rates of growth
in Korea are remarkably higher than in Mexico and Turkey in all sub-periods, even
after the slow down in the 1990s, although the trend deterioration in the growth
performance is similar across countries. In Mexico, the big shock is in the first phase
of liberalization in the 1980s –the so-called lost decade following the debt crisis. In
spite of a slight recovery in the 1990s, the growth rates in both total economy and
manufacturing are remarkably lower than the era of import substituting
industrialization. In Turkey, aggregate growth in the first phase of liberalization is
only slightly lower, and manufacturing growth is almost the same; indeed stagnation
in growth had already started at the last two years of import substitution. But the era
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of capital account liberalization marks a clear deterioration in the growth performance
of manufacturing as well as the aggregate economy with much higher rates of
variation.

<Table 1 approximately here>

The differences in economic policy are particularly reflected to the distributional
outcomes of the countries, as can be seen in Figure 1. Mexico and Turkey experienced
a significant decline in the manufacturing wage share, whereas Korea experienced an
increase in the wage share. Table 2 shows the period averages for the wage share.
Nevertheless, the crises following capital account liberalization have had very similar
effects on the wage share in all three countries leading to a clear and long lasting
decline.

<Figure 1 approximately here>
<Table 2 approximately here>

In addition to the decline in growth and bargaining power of workers during a crisis,
inflationary shocks during these currency crises have set the stage for the decline in
labor’s share. Due to the import dependency of these countries, depreciation has a
pass-through effect on prices, generating dramatic increases in inflation, albeit at
lower rates than the nominal depreciation. These shocks are not only unexpected but
also hard for the workers to reflect to their wages due to the magnitude of the shock.
The depreciation rates had reached up to 90.2% in Mexico in 1994, and 169.5% and
96.0% in Turkey in 1994 and 2001 respectively. In Korea as well, the currency crisis
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has resulted in a nominal depreciation rate of 47.3% in 1998. The outcome is a radical
deterioration in the real wage, and consequently wage share during currency crises.
Indeed similar episodes were also experienced during the early phases of opening up
in Mexico and Turkey, which were accompanied by huge devaluations of the
domestic currency with the aim of achieving higher international competitiveness.

Table 3 below summarizes the developments in the exchange rate and growth during
these crisis episodes, and decomposes the sources of the decline in the wage share to
its sources: i.e. changes in real wages and labor productivity, the latter also
decomposed as changes in value added and employment. In Table 3 only the
developments in the years when a recession is accompanied by a real depreciation of
the currency are shown together with the two years following the crisis.
Table 3
The initial crisis year is always associated with a decline in the wage share, but the
percentage decrease in the wage share by far exceeds the rate of decline in production
during the crises. After a crisis, employers push labor unions to accept dramatic wage
cuts or compulsory unpaid leaves to avoid job losses. Eventually profits are restored
and when the crisis is long past, it is labor, which has carried the burden of
adjustment. The crisis also creates a hysteresis effect that destroys the bargaining
power of labor for a long period afterwards. Diwan (2001) defines crises as episodes
of distributional fights, which leave "distributio nal scars". In all countries, a strong
economic recovery took place right after the crisis, with production returning to its
pre-crisis level within a year, however the fall in the wage share usually continued for
two or even three years. In Mexico, which experienced the early crisis of 1994-1995,
the wage share has declined 29.5% as of 1996 compared to 1993, and indeed has still
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not returned to its pre-crisis level ten years after the crisis. The post 2001 recession in
the manufacturing industry of Mexico has triggered a new declining trend in the wage
share. In Turkey the cumulative decline in the wage share has been 24.8% and 32.2%
following the 1994 and 2001 crises with the decline continuing for two and three years
respectively. The slow recovery in the wage share in Turkey after the 1994 crisis is
again reversed in 2001, and the wage share as of 2003 is even lower than its level in
1994. In Korea, the wage share has continued to decline for three years following the
1997 crisis, and was 21.6% lower in 1999 compared to 1996. In Korea as well the
wage share has not returned back to its pre-crisis level in seven years after the crisis.
In that respect, crisis has brought Korea closer to the cases of Mexico and Turkey,
reversing the increasing trend 7.

The major source of the decline in the wage share during the crisis year is the decline
in the real wage, which owes itself partly to the inflation shock due to depreciation
and partly to a loss in the bargaining power due to lower employment. Employment
declines also in all crisis years, except for 1980 in Turkey, when the crisis was
associated with a military coup, which also banned lay-offs. In both Mexico and
Turkey during all crisis years the decline in the real wage is much higher than the
change in employment, the difference reaching rather dramatic levels during the 1995
Mexican and the 1994 and 2001 Turkey crises. This difference indicates that the
wages adjust rather flexibly to changes in the labor market conditions. On the contrary
during the Korean crisis, the adjustment in employment exceeds that in real wages
quite significantly. In Korea the decline in employment also exceeded that in value
added, leading to productivity increases. Thus the decline in the wage share during the
1998 recession in Korea is associated with both real wage declines and productivity
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increases. In Mexico both 1982 and 1995 are episodes of stagnant productivity
(comparable declines in employment and value added), thus the decline in the wage
share is solely resulting from real wage declines. In the cases of crises of Turkey, both
productivity and real wages decline, with the decline in the latter being significantly
higher. Following the crisis years, both productivity (other than 1983 in Mexico) and
employment recover (except for the post-2001 jobless recovery in Turkey). However
real wages continue to decline for two more years after the crisis in both Mexico and
Turkey (except for the 1981 recovery in wages after the military coup of 1980). The
following rate of decline in real wages is also quite high particularly following the
1995 Mexican and 1994 and 2001 Turkish crises.

Apart from the crisis episodes, the recovery in the wage share is also very weak and
one of the challenging aspects of these developments for the traditional expectations
from trade liberalization is that particularly Mexico and Turkey have extensively
opened up their economies in the 1980s, and have experienced a literal boom in
manufacturing exports first in the 1980s, and then further in the 1990s following the
free trade agreements. Table 4 shows the exports and imports as a ratio to
manufacturing value added. The increase in exports has also been followed by a
significant increase in imports as a result of a reduction in tariffs. The trade deficit in
manufacturing in Turkey, which was already very high during the import substitution
era, decreased during the first phase of liberalization, but then increased remarkably in
the 1990s due to the appreciated exchange rate as well as the Customs Union in 1995
with the EU. Mexico’s trade deficit increased after the liberalization of trade, but there
has been some recovery after NAFTA due to increased outsourcing. Korea on the
other hand started with much higher rates of exports as well as imports in the 1970s
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due to its mixed trade regime dating back to 1960s, and has managed to improve its
export performance in the 1980s, which slightly slowed down in the 1990s. In the
1980s import dependency of Korea decreased also to some extent. Korea has had a
trade surplus in manufacturing early on, which increased remarkably in the 1980s, but
somewhat deteriorated in the 1990s.

FDI inflow also increased remarkably in the 1990s in all three countries in both
aggregate economy and manufacturing, with the intensity of FDI to value added ratio
being higher in the manufacturing industry, as can be seen in Table 5. Mexico has had
a much higher intensity of FDI due to both NAFTA and its border to the US. In
particular in Korea after 1997 crisis, but also in Turkey after 2001 crisis, there has
been significant inflows of FDI, which was facilitated both by a political push for
privatization or deregulation, and with high rates of depreciation of the local currency,
which had led to a dramatic decline in asset prices.

4. A model of distribution

The model of distribution presented here has the nature of a Post-Keynesian
conflicting claims model (eg. Rowthorn, 1977; Arestis, 1986), that explains the
change in labor costs and the inflationary process as an outcome of bargaining in the
labor market, which gives rise to a conflict of interest between labor and capital, quite
different from the neoclassical model, where technology and preferences determine
the relative returns to the factors of production. We incorporate to this model the
effects of globalization, which may increase the distributional conflicts, for a given
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level of economic activity, i.e. result in a downward shift of the wage bargaining and
distribution curve.

The aspirations and the bargaining power of the workers determine the wage setting
process in the labor market. The workers bargain for a nominal wage per worker, w,
given the expected price level, pe, and the expected productivity, prod e. The
bargaining power of workers depends on the labor market conditions, reflected by the
rate of employment (employment/labor force), E/N, as well as the macroeconomic
environment. For convenience of presentation, we define a vector of international
variables, global, and discuss them, once the basic reduced form of the wage share has
been derived. Then w (wage in logarithms) can be written as follows:

wt = b0 + b1et − b1 nt + b2 global + pte + prodte

(1)

where all variables are in logarithms and all coefficients are positive numbers.

Employment, e, is determined via labor demand, which is a positive function of
output, y, and a negative function of the real unit labor cost, which is the share of
labor in output, ws, and there is a certain hysteresis effect from lagged employment,
i.e. lag of y and ws. This is a general form; whethe r the labor costs have a significant
effect on employment is an empirical question.
e t = e 0 + e 1 y t + e 2 y t −1 − e 3 ws t − e 4 wst −1

(2)

The expectations for price and productivity reflect imperfect foresight:

pte = α ⋅ pt −1 + β ⋅ pt

(3)

and
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prodte = σ ⋅ prodt −1 + ω ⋅ prodt

(4)

The coefficients, a, ß, s, ? , not only depend on the formation of the expectations, but
also the bargaining power of the workers. In particular, if a+ß<1, and s+?<1, then
wages are imperfectly indexed to inflation and productivity.

Prices are set as a mark-up over variable costs by the firms in a Kaleckian spirit.
Variable costs include the cost of labor, and domestic and imported inputs, as
developed by Sylos-Labini (1979). Linearizing, and simplifying, price, p, (in
logarithms) is equal to 1+mark-up rate, m, determined by the oligopolistic power of
the firms, plus the unit labor cost, represented by the wage share, ws, and a pass
through effect from the current and past value of the exchange rate, x, which in turn
depends on the degree of import dependence as well as the mark-up power of the
firms (which are jointly reflected in the coefficients i1 and i2 below):
p t = m + Φws t + i1 x t + i2 x t− 1

(5) 8

Productivity (in logarithms) on the other hand is by definition output, y, minus total
employment, i.e. the sum of the number of production and non-production employees.
The presence of fixed employees makes productivity an increasing function of output:
prod t = (1 + δ ) y t − e t

(6)

The actual wage share (in logarithms) is by definition bargained wage minus actual
price minus actual productivity:

wst = wt − pt − prodt

(7)
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Substituting equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) into (7), we get the reduced form for the
wage share:

wst = λ 0 + λ1 yt + λ2 yt − 1 + λ3 wst −1 −

(1 − β )i1
((1 − β )i2 − αi1 )
b
b
xt −
xt− 1 − 1 nt + 2 global
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ

(7a)

where the signs of λ 0 , λ1 , λ 2 , λ 3 are ambiguous, and ϕ is a positive coefficient9. The
constant term reflects exogenous effects of the mark-up level, bargaining and
employment factors. At the estimation stage, changes in these variables will show up
in the error term.

The effect of current output on the wage share will depend on the relative magnitudes
of the positive bargaining effect via labor demand and the negative effect via an
unexpected or not reflected increase in productivity. Thus the wage share can have a
counter or pro-cyclical pattern, depending on these effects. If the labor/output
coefficient is high, if wages are sensitive to labor market conditions, and if
productivity gains are reflected relatively quickly to wages, then the wage share would
be pro-cyclical. We can call the latter two conditions as mutual wage flexibility. Thus
the higher the labor/output ratio is, and the more mutually flexible wages are, the more
pro-cyclical will be the wage share. The effect of lagged growth on the wage share, on
the other hand, depends on the positive bargaining effect via lagged labor demand,
and the lagged productivity effect.

The effect of the lag of the wage share reflects whether a distributional shock is
persistent. It will depend on the relative magnitude of the bargaining effect via
increased labor demand effect of the previous decrease in labor costs, the effect via
20

the productivity increase in the current period, and the effect from past inflation and
past productivity. If past labor costs are not effective on employment, a shock to
distribution will persist.

Finally, the current value of the exchange rate is expected to have a negative effect on
the wage share through its effect on current inflation. The magnitude of the effect
depends on the import dependency of the economy, the ability of the firms to reflect
import price changes to consumers, and the inability of the workers to index wages to
inflation. This coefficient will capture the effect of currency crisis on distribution.
The coefficient of the lag of the exchange rate will be ambiguous depending on the
relative magnitude of the negative effect through its effect on current price, and the
positive effect through the indexation of wages to past inflation. If the absolute values
of the coefficients are close to each other, this can also be interpreted as reflecting
unexpected inflation generated by unexpected depreciation, i.e. the change in
depreciation rate.

The effects of all the explanatory variables will be higher in absolute value the lower
the value of ϕ is, i.e. the lower the effect of labor costs on employment, and the
higher the degree of indexation to current price level is.

Next we specify the role of integration to the global economy, i.e. international trade
and FDI, on the wage bargaining process. Obviously the changes in these variables
affect effective demand, and consequently employment. However, they may also have
further effects on the bargaining power of workers for a given level of economic
activity due to the change in the intensity of competition.
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In contrast to previous studies, which only discuss the effect of the volume of trade
(exports+imports/GDP), this study will analyze the effect of international trade
components separately, and test also the possible differences in the effect of export
demand and import penetration. The traditional trade theory, based on HeckscherOhlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems, expects a positive effect of an increase in the
trade intensity of production (export/output and import/output) on the wage share
(through both wage and employment effects) due to the increased labor intensity of
production in developing countries with a comparative advantage in labor intensive
industries in the long run (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994; Krueger, 1983). Although it
is suggested that in the short run the immobility of sector-specific capital may prevent
the optimal reallocation of production across sectors, and thereby may result in a
decline in the wage share, this is perceived as a temporary phenomena (Edwards,
1988; Milner and Wright, 1998). In versions of the traditional trade theory that
distinguish between skilled vs. unskilled labor, the expectation is that the wage of the
unskilled workers will increase as a result of openness, and that of the skilled workers
will decrease in the long run, and since developing countries have relatively abundant
unskilled labor, the implication of that for the aggregate wage share is an increase.
However, according to the political economy approach export oriented policies have
usually been accompanied by a shift in the balance of power relations in favor of
capital via the deregulation of the labor market,10 and an increase in the threat effects
associated with international capital mobility and outsourcing, which has led to labor
disciplining effects, and has transferred the pressure of international competition from
capital to labor (Burke and Epstein, 2001; Rodrik, 1998). If that is the case, then
openness would lead to a downw ard shift of the distribution curve. However in the
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case of imports there may be an additional mechanism at work: since these countries
are highly import dependent, imported goods are not necessarily the substitutes of
domestically produced goods, and if imported goods are complementary to labor, in
the negative effect will not be observed.

Regarding the within wage distributional impacts, there is also a critique directed to
the traditional trade theory, which quite on the contrary expects an increase in the
wage bill of the skilled labor with respect to the unskilled labor. The explanation is
based on empirical evidence, particularly in the case of Mexico, where increased
international competition, the pressure for technological change, and FDI inflow fr om
the US has adversely affected the relative demand for unskilled labor, and increased
the skill bias of production (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Harrison and Hanson, 1999).
Again if unskilled labor dominates the labor force, this would then correspond to a
decline in the aggregate wage share, with increased inequality among wage earners as
well as between labor and capital. While this literature mostly focuses on the skill
bias, it may additionally be the case that internationalization of production increases
the capital intensity of production, because of the available technologies as well as
international competition. The effort of firms to increase productivity through labor
saving may also contribute to an increased capital intensity of production. Ghosh
(2006) argues that as an outcome of globalization of production labor saving
technological change becomes a common feature in the North and the South alike,
despite low wages in the latter, and the output elasticity of employment is decreasing
in the majority of the successful exporters among the developing countries. If the
resulting productivity gains of technological change can not be reflected to wages,
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wages and the wage share will be adversely affected, not only for the unskilled, but
also skilled workers.

In the case of FDI, the positive expectation is again that an increase in FDI will not
only increase the demand for labor, but that an increase in the ratio of FDI to GDP
will create positive effects on the wage share through the transfer of more productive
technology and better working relations in the firms with foreign capital. However,
obviously, the nature of FDI, whether it is in the form of greenfield FDI, which creates
new production capacity, or brownfield FDI, which involves mergers and ac quisitions,
matters in the realization of the expected positive spill over effects. If FDI is mostly
through mergers and acquisitions, rather than a genuine interest in long term
investment, then the increase in the pressure on the firm through shareholder valuation
can lead to further conflicts in the bargaining process. Also the employment effects of
FDI may be negative through the downsizing of the plant in this case. Second, even
when the positive firm level effects of FDI are realized, the spill-over effects can be
quite limited, which may lead to a dual economy, without any major positive effects
on economy wide competitiveness, employment, and wages (Mencinger, 2003;
Gallagher and Zarsky, 2004). Furthermore FDI can also have destructive effects on
small capital, which on the one hand decreases the bargaining power of labor in these
firms further, and on the other hand destroys jobs in the small domestic firms, which
cannot compete anymore. Gosh (2006) argues that the process of relocation of
production to the South has been part of a broader process of national and
international concentration and centralization of production, which increases the
competitive pressures on domestic small firms as well as large firms. In this case FDI
can favor a particular group of skilled labor, while the unskilled labor’s wage bill as
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well as the aggregate wage share decline. Third, if FDI is efficiency seeking rather
than market seeking, and low labor costs are one of the major factors that attract FDI,
the threat of capital flight in the event of a reversal of this relative labor cost
advantage may generate a significant downward pressure on wages as the share of
FDI exposure of the economy increases, generating a race to the bottom. To sum up, if
FDI is mostly in the form of greenfield investment, market seeking, and have strong
backward linkages to the domestic economy, the effect on the wage share may be
positive; otherwise a negative effect is expected according to the political economy
arguments.

5. Estimation Results

The reduced form of the wage share derived in section 4 forms the basis of the
empirical estimation. This reduced form is particularly useful for technical problems
related to the endogeneity of price and employment in a wage equation. Due to the
problem of endogeneity in the case of exports, imports and FDI, the first lags of these
variables are used. Using a lag is also convenient, while it can be argued that these
variables would effect distribution only through time.

We estimate the model in difference form, due to the existence of unit root not only in
the value added and exchange rate, but also in the wage share and the export and
import ratios. FDI inflow/value added ratio is stationary for all countries; therefore it
will be used in level form11.
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In terms of the lag structures, according to the traditional trade theory, the relationship
between the wage share and the export and import ratios are rather a long term
relation, and it is accepted that in the short run capital immobility can lead to
deterioration in the wage share. Econometrically, this translates into testing the
cointegrating relationship between three I(1) variables, and the Johansen tests also
support the existence of a cointegrating vector among the levels of the wage share,
and the export and import ratios 12. Therefore, we will estimate the change in the wage
share via an error correction model (ECM) with the lagged differences as well as the
levels of the import and export ratios and the lagged level of the wage share as the
explanatory variables. While the differences of the export and import ratios reflect
short-run effects, the levels will show the long-run effects. For robustness check, we
will also estimate short-run relations with only the differences of the variables.
Regarding the other I(1) variables, value added and the exchange rate, the Johansen
test results do not indicate a cointegrating relationship with the wage share; this also
makes intuitively sense, since the wage share is a ratio, whereas real value added as
well as the nominal exchange rate are unbounded variables. Finally, in order to check
the robustness of the form of the equation to be estimated, autoregressive distributed
lag models are estimated, which also suggest the use of the difference of value added
and the exchange rate, level of FDI inflow ratio, and an ECM for the export and
import ratios.

The labor force growth rate has been dropped from the model in order to gain degrees
of freedom, since it was insignificant and did not affect the other coefficients. Besides,
long time series data does not exist for the labor force in urban areas, which could
represent the manufacturing labor force.
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Unlike previous empirical work (Rodrik, 1998; Diwan, 2001; Harrison, 2002; Lee and
Jayadev, 2005), which relies on pooled panel data estimations for all countries or subgroups of countries based on income groups or regional entities, this study is based on
separate estimations for each country. The advantage is to have heterogeneous
coefficients of the explanatory variables and constant terms across countries, as
opposed to pooled panel data estimations, which has the disadvantage of imposing
cross-country homogeneity in the coefficients of explanatory variables, and all the
cross-country differences are captured only by a country specific fixed effect. As we
will see below, if the differences in economic policy among the countries matter,
imposing coefficient homogeneity may deliver an average value of significant and
insignificant coefficients with opposite signs. Also if the variables are not strictly
comparable

across

countries

due

to

statistical

measurement

problems

or

methodological differences, than the advantage of panel data estimation in terms
incorporating cross-country differences may even turn into a further disadvantage.

The estimation technique used in this study is the Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) model. This methodology also allows for common international shocks not
captured by the country-specific explanatory variables, eg. an international crisis like
the Asian crisis, to have effects on the dependent variable via the correlation of the
country-specific residuals.

The advantage of accounting for cross-country differences comes, however, with the
disadvantage of low degrees of freedom, which limits the number of explanatory
variables that can be simultaneously included in the regression. A joint factor could be
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constructed based on the globalization variables; however in order to have a
transparent account of the significance of the variables, they will be kept as separate
variables. This is also convenient, since the time period when the trade and FDI data
are availability do not match.

First we discuss the results of the basic model without the globalization variables,
where the logarithmic change in the wage share in manufacturing is estimated as a
function of the current and lagged values of growth in manufacturing value added and
the nominal depreciation rate. Table 6a shows the results of this regression 13. The
wage share does not have any cyclical behavior (at conventional levels of
significance) with respect to the current value of growth in any of the countries, and
the lag of growth is positively significant only in Mexico. On the other hand, nominal
depreciation has the expected negative significant effect on the wage share in all
countries, and the lag of nominal depreciation is insignificant. The economic
significance of the negative effect of depreciation is also relevant, ranging between 0.14 in Mexico to -0.27 in Turkey. The lagged value of the wage share is significant
and positive in all countries. The results are robust to the exclusion of the insignificant
lags.

<Table 6a and b approximately here>

The insignificance of the growth effects suggests an important question concerning
the robustness of these results, i.e. whether there is a change in the cyclical pattern of
distribution over time. There seems to be no statistically significant break in this
relation in the post-1980s 14. However, there could also be a shift in the cyclical
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behavior of the wage share during the crisis periods. To address this question, a slope
and intercept dummy has been included for growth during recession years. The results
are in Table 6b. The Wald tests for the joint significance of the summation of the
coefficients of the growth and the recession slope dummy are reported at the end of
the Table . We find that the wage share is pro-cyclical during a crisis in all countries.
During a normal year the wage share has no cyclical pattern in Korea and Mexico,
whereas in Turkey the wage share is counter-cyclical during normal years; thus, the
wage share decreases in good years, as well as in years when the economy is
contracting. The recession intercept dummy on the other hand is significant only in
Korea, where it is positive, but the slope and intercept effects of a recession together
still indicate that a 1% decrease in production leads to a 1.2% decrease in the wage
share. The effects are much stronger in Turkey and Mexico. Korea has experienced
very few recession years; nevertheless the results are also robust when high vs. low
growth years are differentiated instead of recession vs. growth years. Overall the
robustness of the findings continues when other variables are also added to the model,
as will be discussed below. The counter-cyclicality of the wage share in Turkey, or the
insignificant response of wages to growth in Korea and Mexico may be due to a low
employment effect of growth, a low responsiveness of wages to favorable labor
market conditions and productivity gains. On the contrary, the pro-cyclical behavior
of wages during a recession may be due to a highly negative employment effect of
recession and high flexibility of wages with respect to adverse employment and
productivit y shocks.

These findings are different from those of Diwan (2001), who performs separate
estimations for crisis and non-crisis years for a panel of countries, and argues that
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labor’s share is pro-cyclical during non-crisis years and counter-cyclical during crisis
years. This difference might be due to pooling a heterogeneous group of countries
(even in the sub-sample of poor vs. rich countries), or defining the crisis based on a
nominal depreciation rate greater than 25% rather than on recession years 15, and
dividing the time series, rather than comparing the coefficient shifts within the data.
Finally an econometric problem exists in Diwan’s estimations, where both the wage
share and GDP (per capita) are used in levels. Both wage share and GDP has a unit
root, however it is not straightforward that these two variables are cointegrated in all
countries. These technical issues are not discussed in Diwan’s paper. Moreover
cointegration is a long run relation, and it is not very useful to talk about the long-run
relation between these two variables during normal vs. crisis years; the crisis is a
short-run shock and its effect can be observed via the short-run relation (the effect of
the change in GDP on the change in the wage share) during a crisis year. To chec k for
the robustness of our estimations, we also estimated an ECM for the basic model, and
we do not find a statistically significant and robust long-run relation between growth
and the wage share, whereas the short term pro-cyclical coefficient of growth remains
to be robust in the ECM estimations for all countries16.

If we interpret these results for a crisis year, the cause of the decline in the wage share
during a crisis is explained by the dramatic rates of depreciation as well as the decline
in production. The persistence of the initial decline in the wage share is related to the
lagged effect from the wage share itself. Thus the fall in labor costs during the
recession year does not have strong employment effects afterwards. In Mexico, the
lagged growth is also significant. Again in Mexico, the lag of the nominal
depreciation is positively significant, indicating that the change in the nominal
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depreciation rate is the source of the shock on wages through the generation of
unexpected inflation.

In the remainder of the empirical analysis, the results of the globalization variables are
reported based on the specifications with the recession intercept and slope dummies,
and the robustness of the results are also reported for the cases without the dummies.

To test the effects of openness on the wage share , we estimate both an ECM model
and a short -run relation based on differences. T he ECM is estimated in the following
form:

?ws t=b0+b1iΣ i=0,1? yt-i+b 2iΣ i=0,1? xt-i+b 3? wst-1+b4? expt+b 5?impt
+b6wst -1+ b7expt-1 +b8 impt-1

Eq (8)

where exp and imp are export and imports as a ratio to value added, and all variables
are in logarithms. The long run effect of export/output on the wage share is a 1=b7/-b6
and of import/output is a 2= b8/-b6., and wst -1=a1 *expt -1 +a2 *impt-1 represents the longrun relationship. Stability requires that the speed of adjustment coefficient, b6, is
negative.

Table 7a reports the results of the ECM estimations. In all three countries there is no
significant short -run export or import effect (with b4 and b5 being statistically zero).
But in the long run, in Mexico and Turkey the cointegrating relation between export
ratio and the wage share is significant, however with an opposite sign according to the
traditional trade theory. An increase in the export intensity of the economy has a
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negative effect on the wage share in the long run, and the effect is economically
significant: -0.20 in Mexico and -0.27 in Turkey. In Korea, the long run effects of
exports are also insignificant. Finally in all countries imports are insignificant in the
long run as well, indicating that imports are not a substitute for domestic production,
and thus exert no negative competitive pressures over labor. The results are robust,
even when we do not control for the nominal depreciation or even growth, lagged
variables, or the recession dummies. The results for exports and imports are also
robust to the exclusion of the other trade component. The coefficients of nominal
depreciation and the recession effects are robust with respect to the basic specification
as well.

<Table 7a and 7b approximately here>
To test for robustness, Table 7b reports the results for the short run estimations with
only the differences of the variables as the explanatory variable. In this case, the short
run coefficients for Mexico and Turkey are significant, but the economic significance
of the coefficient for Mexico is rather small.

Finally alternative estimation methods are also used to check the robustness of the
results. As an alternative to ECM, a vector error correction model (VECM) is
estimated. Instead of the single equation based ECM, VECM estimates a system of
ECM equations for all the variables, which are argued to be endogenously related (in
our case wage share, export and import shares) in the form of a vector autoregression
model (VAR). However VECM comes with the cost of leaving out the SUR method
that was utilized in the single equation ECM estimations, where error terms were
correlated across countries. The results of the VECM are nevertheless very similar to
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the ECM results 17. Indeed the issue of endogeneity is not discussed in most of the
ECM estimations, rather the interpretation of the cointegrating relation is made
according to theory or the direction of causality between the variables based on
Granger causality tests. In this case, the Granger causality tests suggest that exports
cause the wage share in Turkey and Mexico rather than vice-versa, and there is no
causal relationship between wage share and imports18. These are consistent with the
interpretation made above based on the ECM results in Table 7a. In Korea there is no
causal relation between exports and the wage share, but there is two way causality
between imports and the wage share according to the Granger causality results;
however the ECM results do not verify a significant causal relationship between these
two variables. Finally as a third test to check the robustness of the results, the short
run estimation is repeated using instrumental variables approach19. However due to
the limited degrees of freedom, all variables including the exogenous variables turn
into insignificant variables. Furthermore, given the significance of the cointegration
relationship, it is preferable to base the discussion on long run relationship rather than
the short run.

As a result, we can conclude that the export boom in manufacturing has had a negative
effect on the wage share in Mexico and Turkey. Thus, the negative bargaining effects
of increased export intensity dominate its supposedly positive demand effects. These
results are also consistent with the explanations based on technology bias in
production due to openness. Moreover the former comparative advantages of the
middle income countries like Mexico and Turkey in the low skilled labor intensive
products are being significantly challenged by the entry of the lower wage countries
like China and India into the world trade markets. However even in Korea e xports fail
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to deliver the expected positive effects, but the existence of industrial policy and
reliance on new investments and productivity increases as well as specialization in
more skilled and higher value added industries at least prevents the negative
competitive pressures over wages.

In the case of FDI, we report two specifications: In Table 8a manufacturing FDI/value
added is used for Mexico, and aggregate FDI/GDP for Korea and Turkey. According
to these results FDI has a statistically significant negative effect on the wage share in
Mexico, but the economic significance of the effect is small (a 1% increase in FDI
inflow/value added leading to a 0.05% decrease in the manufacturing wage share). For
Korea and Turkey it is not possible to verify either the wage dumping effect or the
promised positive effect. However, the effect turns to negative for Turkey, when
manufacturing FDI/value added is used (which unfortunately can be estimated only
for the very short period of 1993-2003), and the effect is economically also
significant, but must be evaluated with caution due to limited degrees of freedom. The
results for this specification, where for all countries manufacturing FDI/value added is
used, are in Table 8b. Due to the limited degrees of freedom, the lags of growth,
exchange rate, and the recession dummies are excluded. T he results in both Table 8a
and 8b are robust with respect to the use of two lags of FDI as well as the exclusion of
growth and nominal depreciation, or insignificant lags .

<Table 8a and 8b approximately here>

Finally to test the robustness of the results, the estimation in Table 8a is repeated using
a three stage least squares method with instrumental variables20. The insignificance of
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FDI stayed robust for Turkey and Korea, but it also turned to be insignificant in the
case of Mexico. Given that the economic significance of the negative (and statistically
significant) effect of FDI is also low (according to the results in Table 8a), it makes
sense to express the common result of the two different methods for Mexico as
evidence of the lack of a positive effect of FDI on the wage share.

The results about FDI for Mexico are nevertheless interesting, because they indicate
that the low wage strategy of attracting FDI in Mexico did not create any positive
effects on the wage share in manufacturing. Although 72% of FDI in Mexico is
greenfield investment (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2004), the positive possible effects of
this is overshadowed with the efficiency seeking character of FDI, the low integration
to the local market, and the threat effects of capital flight. The results for Turkey and
Korea also do not indicate any positive spill over effects from FDI to the
manufacturing wage share. However the FDI inflow to these countries is also much
lower, and usually coincides with the crisis and post -crisis episodes of the late 1990s
and 2000s, when there was a major change in the terms of bargaining at the expense
of labor.

Although these results are country specific, and are not directly comparable with the
panel data results of the previous empirical work, a comparison is indicative to see
how they match up to the general trends. The results on the effect of nominal
depreciation and foreign trade (for the case of Mexico and Turkey) are consistent with
Lee and Jayadev (2005), Harrison (2002), and Rodrik (1998). Compared to Diwan
(2001), the results regarding the effect of nominal depreciation is also consistent, but
results on the effect of foreign trade differ from Diwan’s findings (2001), who reports
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that the negative impact of trade on labor is dominated by normal years, whereas there
is a positive effect during a crisis. However, his estimation method does not take into
account the problem of endogeneity between exports and labor costs, as well as time
series properties. Most of all our results for trade effects in dicate the importance of
country specific factors regarding industrial policy. Also exports and imports have
different effects, rather than trade volume playing a uniform role. In the case of FDI,
the results indicating a low negative or insignificant effect for Mexico, mixed
evidence for Turkey, and no effect in Korea, do not completely correspond to the
significant negative effect in Harrison (2002), which might be related to the use of
panel data, as well as problems with endogeneity, i.e. an inverse causation. Although
our results must be interpreted with caution, the importance of country differences
must be considered.

6. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the effect of globalization and crisis on the wage share in
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey based on a Post-Keynesian model of distribution that has
been estimated for the manufacturing industry. The crises of the post-1990s have had
a clear and lasting negative effect on the manufacturing wage share in all countries ,
whereas the effect of openness, in particular international trade depends on industrial
policy structure.

Regarding the effects of the crisis, in all three countries, production recovered strongly
a year after the crisis, but the decline in the wage share has been much more
persistent. Interestingly enough, although the wage share does not reflect a clear
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cyclical pattern in Mexico and Korea during the normal years, it is pro-cyclical during
a crisis in all three countries. Thus , although the wage share does not respond to
growth in good years, it decreases as the economy contracts. Moreover in Turkey, the
wage share is counter-cyclical during the normal years, but pro-cyclical during the
crisis, where capital gets the benefits of growth and labor the burden of the crisis.

The depreciation of the local currency, either through the official devaluations of the
early stages of liberalization or after the financial crises, has also a significant negative
effect on the wage share in all three countries. Dramatic depreciations generate
inflation shocks, which are both unexpected and not reflected to wages under the
intense conditions of the distributional struggle during episodes of crisis.

The positive expectations of the traditional trade theory regarding the effects of
openness on the wage share, which shaped the structural adjustment programs, have
also not been observed. Quite on the contrary, in both Mexico and Turkey exports ,
increased exposure to the global markets has intensified the conf licts in the bargaining
process and resulted in negative pressures on the wage share in the manufacturing
industry. In Korea, the active industrial policy of the state, which has facilitated a
continuous improvement in international competitiveness based on new investment
and productivity increases, has alleviated the negative pressures on wages due to the
increased international competition.

In the case of FDI, there is no evidence of a positive effect on the manufacturing wage
share. In Mexico the high inflow of capital, particularly after NAFTA might even
have a negative, albeit low effect on the wage share. The lack of positive FDI effects
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is related to the dominance of the efficiency seeking FDI with low domestic backward
linkages, even if it is mostly greenfield investment. There is also some evidence of a
negative effect of manufacturing FDI on the wage share in Turkey, but the results
need to be interpreted cautiously due to the limited time series data. In Korea, the
wage share is not affected by FDI. But it is fair to conclude that attracting FDI at all
costs does not seem to be a positive strategy, particularly in terms of labor’s share.

Since the empirical results are limited to manufacturing industry only, some final
remarks on the implications of these results for the aggregate economy is in place
here. First, it is true that manufacturing industry is expected to be affected more
intensely by the increase in openness to trade compared to the non-tradable sectors;
however both in tradable and non-tradable sectors the effects of globalization through
capital mobility and FDI flows might be more similar. Second, manufacturing
industry is representing the relatively more organized segments of the labor market,
and plays the role of a wage setting leader for the other sectors. So we could expect
the trends in other sectors to be similar, if not experiencing further deterioration.
Particularly regarding the effects of the general slow down in aggregate growth as
well crisis episodes, the affects on less organized non-manufacturing sectors can be
more severe, given that wage inequality is increasing even within manufacturing
industry (Galbraith et al, 2000).

The findings about the manufacturing industry in three major developing countries
show that the process of globalization has not been able to deliver its promises to
labor. In the absence of a trade policy designed based on industrial development
priorities and incomes policy, the increased global competitive pressures are being
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shifted onto labor. Moreover the increased frequency of crisis in the global economy
leads to a persistent deterioration in the share of wages in income. Dependence on
global export markets and the destructive effects of speculative capital flows make it
also harder for countries to preserve a stable development path. In order to be able to
realize the possible benefits of international demand, and generate a not only
sustainable but also egalitarian industrial restructuring, a combination of industrial and
trade policy as well as incomes policy is required. These outcomes call for an
alternative macroeconomic policy framework and new global institutions to provide
the proper conditions for such policies.
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Table 1: Growth % (annual average)
in GDP
in manufacturing value added
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
1970-79
Mean
8.29
6.43
4.70
18.66
6.44
6.11
Variation
0.28
0.34
0.68
0.35
0.45
0.93
1980-89
Mean
7.68
2.29
4.08
11.02
2.17
6.29
Variation
0.49
1.97
0.85
0.65
2.52
0.88
1990-03
Mean
6.06
3.01
3.75
7.66
3.26
4.65
Variation
0.71
1.12
1.51
0.91
1.52
1.44
1980-03
Mean
6.74
2.71
3.88
9.06
2.80
5.34
Variation
0.60
1.41
1.23
0.78
1.82
1.15
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
Note: Variation=standard deviation/mean

Figure 1: Wage /Value added in Manufacturing Industry, % (1970 -2003)
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Turkey

Table 2: Wage share in manufacturing value added
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
1970-79
44.18
55.21
30.71
1980-89
50.91
38.20
22.08
1990-03
50.90
31.01
19.00
1980-03
50.90
34.01
20.29
Source: As in Figure 1.
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Table 3: The sources of the change in the wage share during a crisis
Annual % change in
Exchange rate
(local
currency/$)

Wage share
Real wage per
Real exchange rate
(Wage bill / value worker
(deflated
(local currency/$)
Real value added
added)
by CPI)
Employment

Productivity
(Real value added /
employment)

Korea
1998
1999
2000

47.32
-15.17
-4.87

37.02
-15.86
-6.97

-7.90
21.77
16.98

-12.58
-2.48
1.45

-2.10
4.92
5.65

-13.74
2.24
6.80

6.78
19.11
9.53

Mexico
1982
1983
1984

130.07
112.93
39.75

44.77
5.53
-15.58

-2.74
-7.84
5.01

-1.60
-21.74
-9.63

-3.16
-22.46
-6.15

-2.04
-7.13
2.07

-0.72
-0.76
2.89

1995
1996
1997

90.20
18.38
4.20

40.89
-11.90
-13.62

-4.94
10.83
9.94

-22.25
-7.07
4.89

-13.07
-8.62
-0.52

-5.31
6.88
8.79

0.39
3.70
1.06

Turkey
1980
1981
1982

144.67
46.27
46.16

16.41
7.10
11.71

-6.21
10.33
6.36

-19.76
-11.88
-7.19

-38.50
11.05
-2.17

1.17
1.42
3.76

-7.29
8.78
2.50

1994
1995
1996

169.55
54.84
77.57

30.68
-17.69
-1.54

-5.60
11.80
7.50

-22.22
-3.31
9.98

-14.14
-0.15
-5.14

-4.27
4.08
6.82

-1.39
7.42
0.65

2001
2002
2003

96.03
22.98
0.42

26.96
-15.17
-19.85

-8.05
8.20
8.44

-24.27
-5.51
-5.23

-27.60
-11.39
-10.08

-2.94
0.61
1.82

-5.26
7.54
6.50

Note: The real wage is deflated by CPI, whereas productivity is calculated based on real value added deflated by PPI.
Thus the difference in the % change in the wage share and the % change in the real wage-% change in productivity is
the differences in inflation rates in CPI and PPI.
Source: Own calculations based on OECD STAN for Mexico and Korea,
and Annual Survey of Employment, Payments, Production and Tendencies in Manufacturing Industry for Turkey.
Source for the exchange rate and CPI is World Bank World Development Indicators. Real exchange rate is deflated by CPI.

Table 4: Foreign trade
Export/value added
Import/value added
in manufacturing industry %
in manufacturing industry %
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
1970-79
86.89
6.44
5.44
79.79
25.74
44.68
1980-89
112.70
20.96
30.92
69.10
42.17
46.97
1990-03
104.35
95.60
73.51
70.76
112.32
104.04
1980-03
107.83
64.50
55.77
70.07
83.09
80.26
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
Table 5: FDI inflow (by non-residents)
Total FDI/GDP, %
Manufacturing FDI/value added %
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
Korea*
Mexico* Turkey*
1970-79
0.19
0.80
0.17
1980-89
0.26
1.16
0.20
0.90
7.11
1990-03
0.70
2.39
0.61
1.73
11.99
1.97
1980-03
0.51
1.88
0.44
1.51
10.08
1.97
Source: FDI manufacturing: OECD, total World Bank World Development Indicators
FDI manufacturing for Korea: 1985-2003, Mexico: 1981-2003; Turkey:1992-2003
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Table 6: The basic model for ∆log(wage share) (1972 2003)
Included observations: 32
Table 6a : Basic
Korea
Mexico
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient
Prob.
constant
0.002
0.903
-0.028
0.179
∆log(value added) t
0.095
0.382
0.401
0.166
∆log(exchange rate) t
-0.202
0.003***
-0.144
0.010***
∆log(wage share) t-1
0.228
0.118*
0.296
0.093*
∆log(value added) t-1
0.039
0.699
0.471
0.096 *
∆log(exchange rate) t-1
-0.107
0.159
0.061
0.340
recession dummy*∆log(value added)
t
recession dummy
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin -Watson stat
Prob(Q -stat)
Null: no 1st order serial correlation
Null: no 2nd order serial correlation

Turkey
Coefficient
0.024
-0.044
-0.272
0.295
0.355
0.126

Prob.
0.693
0.917
0.019**
0.099*
0.374
0.324

-

-

Table 6 b: With recession intercept and slope dummies
Korea
Mexico
Turkey
Coefficient
Prob.
Coefficient
Prob.
Coefficient
-0.007
0.627
-0.042
0.251
0.148
0.137
0.243
0.227
0.670
-1.409
-0.212
0.004***
-0.119
0.022**
-0.297
0.229
0.100*
0.275
0.091*
0.247
0.055
0.574
0.697
0.014***
0.237
-0.098
0.177
0.105
0.096*
0.126
1.014
0.081

0.130
0.023**

2.371
0.072

0.017**
0.142

7.763
0.281

0.449
2.037

0.422
1.959

0.136
2.124

0.496
2.179

0.485
2.157

0.229
2.271

0.192
0.422

0.490
0.477

0.914
0.926

0.278
0.525

0.636
0.521

0.324
0.532

0.069

0.004

0.089

Prob(growth+growth*recession
dummy=0)
*,**,*** stand for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Prob.
0.061**
0.044**
0.006*
0.102*
0.525
0.279
0.077*
0.346

Table 7: The effect of foreign trade on ∆log(wage share) (1972-2003)
Included observations: 32
Table 7a: ECM Model
Korea
Mexico
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient
constant
0.721
0.412
2.057
∆log(value added) t
0.050
0.707
0.051
∆log(exchange rate) t
-0.144
0.091*
-0.162
∆log(wage share) t -1
0.263
0.127
0.181
∆log(value added) t-1
0.023
0.844
0.013
∆log(exchange rate) t-1
-0.111
0.292
-0.046
recession dummy* ∆log(value added) t
1.145
0.071*
1.631
recession dummy
0.068
0.057*
0.057
∆log(export/value added) t-1
-0.006
0.925
-0.038
∆log(import/value added) t-1
-0.047
0.613
-0.047
log(wage share) t-1
-0.163
0.154
-0.464
log(export/value added) t-1
0.037
0.223
-0.095
log(import/value added) t-1
-0.059
0.612
-0.007

Prob.
0.000***
0.899
0.000***
0.166
0.962
0.465
0.044**
0.147
0.338
0.413
0.000***
0.003***
0.854

Turkey
Coefficient
1.202
-1.585
-0.321
0.280
0.116
0.241
6.609
0.187
-0.155
-0.101
-0.291
-0.079
0.029

Prob.
0.017**
0.008***
0.004***
0.046**
0.756
0.052**
0.073*
0.451
0.047**
0.399
0.011***
0.031**
0.639

Table 7b: Short-run Model
Korea
Mexico
Coefficient
Prob.
Coefficient
Prob.
-0.005
0.708
-0.026
0.468
0.099
0.413
0.153
0.765
-0.181
0.019**
-0.131
0.008***
0.197
0.232
0.172
0.295
0.084
0.461
0.514
0.086*
-0.118
0.209
0.128
0.040**
1.049
0.103*
2.454
0.011***
0.067
0.063*
0.075
0.123
0.010
0.866
-0.098
0.030**
-0.088
0.260
-0.032
0.644
-

Turkey
Coefficient
0.159
-1.482
-0.394
0.202
0.372
0.262
8.539
0.324
-0.203
-0.063
-

Adjusted R -squared

0.461

0.661

0.395

0.473

0.521

0.355

Durbin-Watson stat
Prob(Q-stat)

2.327

1.878

2.293

2.209

2.152

2.048

Null: no 1st order serial correlation
Null: no 2nd order serial correlation

0.166
0.384

0.757
0.867

0.235
0.235

0.254
0.504

0.614
0.748

0.763
0.649

*,**,*** stand for 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance levels respectively.
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Prob.
0.040**
0.020**
0.000***
0.173
0.323
0.027**
0.030**
0.224
0.012***
0.567
-

Table 8: The effect of FDI on ∆log(wage share)
Table 8a : Manufacturing FDI/value added for Mexico,
aggregate FDI/GDP for Korea and Turkey
Korea (1977-2003) Mexico (1982-2003) Turkey (1972-2003)
27 observations
22 observations
32 observations
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient
Prob.
Coefficient Prob.
constant
-0.002
0.883
0.026
0.525
0.194
0.029**
∆log(value added) t
0.107
0.388
0.706
0.163
-1.445
0.041**
∆log(exchange rate) t
-0.162
0.055**
-0.083
0.045**
-0.304
0.005***
∆log(wage share) t -1
0.350
0.031**
0.080
0.565
0.216
0.193
∆log(value added) t-1
0.045
0.658
0.977
0.000***
0.096
0.799
∆log(exchange rate) t-1
-0.077
0.295
0.069
0.207
0.079
0.513
recession dummy* ∆log(value added) t
1.037
0.096*
1.629
0.048**
6.562
0.101*
recession dummy
0.069
0.033**
0.089
0.037**
0.214
0.473
log(FDI inflow/value added) t-1
0.002
0.713
-0.050
0.001***
0.012
0.474
Adjusted R -squared
Durbin-Watson stat
Prob(Q-stat)
Null: no 1st order serial correlation

0.539
2.476

0.747
2.150

0.208
2.198

0.171

0.878

Null: no 2nd order serial correlation

0.392

0.986

Table 8b: Manufacturing FDI/value added for all countries
Korea (1986-2003)
18 observations
Coefficient
Prob.
0.010
0.592
-0.048
0.798
-0.266
0.010***
0.394
0.029**
0.005
0.604

Mexico (1982-2003)
22 observations
Coefficient
Prob.
0.088
0.029**
0.752
0.010***
-0.079
0.080*
0.312
0.031**
-0.051
0.008***

Turkey (1993-2003)
11 observations
Coefficient Prob.
0.277
0.007***
-0.142
0.771
-0.339
0.006***
0.127
0.562
-0.222
0.004***

0.482

0.467
0.034
2.593
0.164

0.607
0.058
2.309
0.357

0.453
0.099
2.002
0.525

0.605

0.364

0.488

0.813

*,**,*** stand for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively.
Due to unbalanced data, the covariance terms are down-weighted by dividing with the maximum of the number of observations.
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1

The lack of data on functional income distribution and wages is worth noting. Labor share

data existed in the World Bank WDI database for the manufacturing sector until 1993, but
then the release of this data was terminated in the following ve rsions of this database. The
wage and productivity data in the Economist Intelligence Unit starts only from the 1980s
onwards for some countries and from the 1990s for most others. In the UN database, labor’s
income, both in manufacturing and nationwide, is only provided for some countries, and
usually only from the 1990s onward.
2

STAN is primarily based on member countries' Annual National Accounts by activity tables

and uses data from other sources, such as national business surveys/censuses, to estimate any
missing detail. STAN reports both labor compensation data and wages and salaries wherever
available, but for Korea and Mexico only labor compensation data is reported.
3

This data is reported in the Annual Survey of Employment, Payments, Production and

Tendencies in Manufacturing Industry based on firm level surveys supplied by the Turkey
Statistical Institute for all public sector firms and private firms with 10 or more persons
engaged for the period of 1950-2001. For 1997-2001 period data for private firms with less
than 10 persons engaged are also announced, but the wage share figures in aggregate do not
show much deviation between all firms vs. firms with 10 or more persons engaged. Due to a
change in the survey methodology the data after 2001 is still not announced. Regarding the
National Accounts data, GDP based on incomes approach is reported only for the period of

1987-2005. The payment to employees data in the National Accounts include the social
security and pension contributions of the employe rs; also estimations are made to incorporate
the payments to employees in the firms employing less than 10 persons. The wage and salary
data in the Survey include wages and salaries, per diems, overtime payments, bonuses,
indemnities, payments in kind, bef ore gross income tax, social security and pension fund
premium deductions from the employees, and excludes the contributions to social security etc.
by the employers. Nevertheless, the two data series, i.e. the labor share based on survey data
and National Accounts, for the common period of 1987-2001 show similar trends with a
correlation coefficient of 0.87. The wage share based on the manufacturing industry surveys is
extended using the percentage change in the wage share in manufacturing industry based on
the National Accounts for the years 2002-2003.
4

For e.g. in 2000, the last normal year before the crisis, the wage share according to the

manufacturing survey in Turkey is 22.3%, where as the share of labor compensation in
manufacturing value added in Mexico is 30.7% and 45.1% in Korea. The share of labor
compensation in manufacturing value added in Turkey as reported in the National Accounts is
30.3% –a rate comparable to Mexico.
5

However, ILO reports the data on self-employed at a sectoral level jointly with the data on

employers. Alternatively it is possible to calculate the share of employees in total employment
for certain years, but the lack of long time series data on self-employment in Mexico and
Turkey makes a correction (based on the estimated labor income of the self-employed)
impossible for the whole period of 1970-2003; even for the later periods there are years when
data is not available due to changes in the definition of the classifications. The latter is also a
problem for Korea.
6

According to ILO data in 1993, the share of employees in manufaturing total employment is

84.7 in Korea, 75.6 in Mexico and 75.5 in Turkey based on ISIC-Rev.2 industrial and ICSE-

1

58 status classification. In mid to late 1990s the definitions of the classifications changed,
which make comparisions through time within a country harder but based on ISIC -Rev.3
industrial and ICSE-93 status classification for the latest year available the the share of
employees in manufaturing total employment is as follows: 82.2% in Korea in 2000, 77.0% in
Mexico in 2000 and 81.5% in Turkey in 2002.
7

Crotty and Lee (2002) and Crotty and Dymski (2001) emphasize the importance of crisis

episodes in facilitating a radical restructuring, which could not be achieved via a democratic
process under normal economic circumstances.
8

Indeed, unit labor cost in nominal terms is P*WS. Thus

P = M o (P ⋅ WS + d ⋅ P + f 1 X t + f 2 X t −1 ). The logarithmic function for P in equation (5) is a
linear approximation of this equation, where Φ is a positive coefficient less than unity.
9

λ o = [b0 + e0 (1 + b1 − ω − σ ) − m(1 − β + α )] / ϕ
λ1 = [e1 b1 − (1 − ω )(1 + δ − e1 )] / ϕ
λ 2 = [e2 (b1 + (1 − ω )) + σ (1 + δ − e1 )] / ϕ
λ 3 = [−e4 b1 + αΦ − e4 (1 − ω ) + e3σ ] / ϕ
ϕ = [1 + e3 (1 + b1 − ω ) + (1 − β )Φ ]

The second lags of y, ws and x have been dropped for convenience, related to the shortness of
the time series data, which will be important at the estimation stage.
10

Since trade and capital account liberalization and labor market deregulation have been

implemented as part of a structural adjustment package, their trend is expected to be the
inversely related to variables like unionization, collective bargaining coverage and
organizational strength, which are institutional variables that we cannot incorporate to our
analysis due to the absence of good time series indicators. See van der Hoeven and Saget,
2004 for a review of the links between globalization, changes in labor market institutions, and
labor market outcomes in the developing countries.

2

11

Unit root test results are available upon request.

12

Cointegration test results are available upon request. Since FDI inflow is I(0), it can not

have a cointegrating relation with the wage share. One could try this by the stock of the FDI;
however data for this is not available, and summing up the FDI inflow -outflow data through
years to get a stock variable does not take into account the depreciation rate. Moreover,
manufacturing specific FDI data is very short, and does not allow for ECM estimations.
13

The Q-statistics indicate that there is no first or second order serial correlation in the

country specific residuals, as indicated by the probability of the Q-statistics, which are
reported at the end of the estimation results.
14

The slope dummy for 1980s for growth is insignificant for all countries. We also did not

find a significant negative trend in the wage share estimations, which is consistent with the
results of Lee and Jayadev (2005) for upper middle income developing countries, but different
from Diwan (2001).
15

The recession years correspond to years of nominal depreciation higher than 25% in all

cases except f or three incidences in Mexico (1993, 2001, 2003). However there are many
years w hen a higher than 25% nominal depreciation does not necessarily mean a crisis in
Turkey and Mexico due to high inflation rates.
16

The results are available upon request. Robustness checks are made for the inclusion of the

level of the exchange rate.
17

The results are available upon request. In the VECM estimations lags of growth and

depreciation are used as exogenous variables.
18

The results are available upon request.

19

A three stage least squares method is estimated, which is a two stage least squares

estimation with error terms correlated across countries. As instruments the lags of the

3

endogenous and exogenous variables and the GDP of OECD are used. The results are
available upon request.
20

, The lags of the endogenous and exogenous variables are used as instruments.

4

